

JPRS 76017

9 July 1980

USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1523



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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MILITARY REGULATIONS: VIOLATIONS DESCRIBED

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Col Justice S. Lugovtsov: "From Good Motives"]

[Text] Senior Lieutenant A. Fedorov's decision was dictated by concern for protection of a document. When an employee of the Soviet Army, F. Yakhin, asked him for his work book on leaving the unit, the officer calmly advised him to go to his new place of work. "And," he said, "we'll send you the book by mail."

But it happened that the sending of the document was delayed. And really, this time the mail operated more slowly than usual. The packet arrived at the indicated address when Yakhin was no longer there, and his work book was returned to the unit. But Senior Lieutenant Fedorov was no longer here, having departed for a new place of service. Not knowing what to do with the document which had been returned, the headquarters clerk, Junior Sergeant A. Ryzhkov, placed it in the safe. It was subsequently found there by personnel from the Judge Advocate's Office who were checking on the complaint of F. Yakhin: Because of the work book's absence, the man could not get a job for ten months!

In analyzing what had happened, of course one can complain about a rare coincidence. One also can and must reproach the unit headquarters personnel who did not record either the dispatch of the valuable letter or its return. The check also disclosed other shortcomings in work with letters and statements of citizens which arrive in this unit. But all the same, the initial reason for the red tape which was permitted here, of course, was the fact that Senior Lieutenant Fedorov did not give the man his work book directly upon his release, that is, as required by Article 39 of the Labor Code of the RSFSR. If an officer should try to do "better" than required, neither the interests of the worker himself nor of the enterprise which he would like to hire him would be violated, and really they could not be.

But just why did a competent, conscientious comrade commit such a blunder and proceed contrary to the law? Why did considerations of the owner's possible loss of his work book prove to be a more ponderable "argument" for

the senior lieutenant? It is believed that this was only because the officer looked upon the provision of the law not as an immutable command, but as some recommendation which need not be considered if there is a "more reasonable" solution.

Alas, one must encounter such "solutions" every once in a while. Some officials do not understand that a law is equally applicable under any circumstances, in relation to all citizens. That, accumulating all the theory and practice of the question being touched upon, he proceeds namely in the interests of the matter, in which regard he considers the interests of the personality as well as those of the state and the near as well as the remote consequences of its application. But to proceed without agreeing with its requirements--this just signifies making the successes of the matter dependent on chance or even disregarding them completely.

One could calculate the loss of working time which the "initiative" of Senior Lieutenant Fedorov in employing labor legislation cost the state. But in other headquarters and offices, how often it is suggested that those being released from work come for their work book tomorrow because today the needed entry has not yet been made. How many forced absences stand behind this "unnoticed" departure from the legal norm! And how often were the entries themselves made incorrectly while the length of service of a conscientious worker is interrupted and an open violator of labor discipline appears both honest and conscientious in a new collective! But again, this all happens only because someone nevertheless is inclined to judge the legal norm in general and not the requirements which apply personally to him in a given specific situation.

But you see, it is not far from such a simplified view of the law to its arbitrary interpretation.

For example, not so long ago Engineer-Colonel A. Kuzovatkin displayed a unique understanding of the regulations concerning servicemen's material responsibility. He considered it possible to employ fines against two officers as...disciplinary punishment. You see, Lieutenants V. Karpin and V. Maksimov lost the railroad tickets which they used and which had been obtained using military transportation documents, and then followed the order to hold back the cost of the trip from both of them.

But in what regulation will you find such a measure of influence for self-evident negligence? In fact, you see, servicemen can be held financially responsible if they caused the state real loss. But how can we speak of any loss if the lieutenants actually used the transportation documents issued to them to acquire tickets and were where they were supposed to be? They caused the state no loss. By losing the tickets they only violated the order for accountability established by regulation and they should answer for that. How? In accordance with the rules of the Disciplinary Regulation.

The attempt to apply a law in falsely understood interests of the matter thus led to the opposite results. Engineer-Colonel Kuzovatkin proceeded

from the interests of strengthening discipline, but he distorted disciplinary practice and inflicted certain damage on his own authority. I am not even mentioning the moral costs of the legal error. It occurred because the official opposed the clear rule of law with his own conjecture.

It is easy to note that both in the case with which these paragraphs were begun and in the one just presented it was sufficient for the comrades to delve into the specific norm of the law for everything to fall into place. But alas, they have not yet developed such a habit--to compare their actions with the norms of law. So a respectful attitude toward law in general was not formed. How great is the risk of error for such an official when the discussion concerns a decision which is not specially stipulated in a legal document or is only basically stipulated and it is to be carried out in accordance with the aggregate of a number of legal norms.

Major G. Osipov correctly assumed that to increase the combat readiness of the entire subunit considerable significance would be had by the way things are going in two platoons where the posts of platoon leader were temporarily vacant. And unquestionably this would have been correct if he had used his authority to attain an increase in the role of the sergeants in these platoons, had intensified the checking of the state of affairs there by the company commander and other officials to whom the people were subordinate in their service, and was concerned about strengthening party and Komsomol influence on the training and indoctrinational process in these collectives. But the officer proceeded differently. He "appointed" Warrant Officers [praporshchik] G. Bogatyrev and Z. Pliyev "unofficial platoon leaders."

It cannot be denied that, as a matter of fact, Major Osipov's motives were good. And actually, in the regulations there is no direct prohibition for the commander to proceed in this manner. But it by no means follows from this that he can proceed in this way.

The very absence of such terms as "wearing two hats" and "unofficial commander or chief" in the legal acts which determine Soviet military organizational development should stimulate a person who respects the law to doubt the permissibility of such a decision. Nor did Major Osipov have the official authority to shift the warrant officers subordinate to him in their service. But even if he had such authority, just how did the officer conceive the responsibility of the warrant officers for the performance of the duties of two posts at once? And their rights in regard to "unofficial subordinates?" And even the rights of other officials in regard to the "unofficial commanders?" In short, this time, too, the good motives of the commander did not lead to the desired results but, on the contrary, only aggravated the shortcomings with which he decided to struggle using incorrect methods.

It is clear that where deviations from the law are possible from the completely sincere desire to organize matters better, it is easier for the one who violates the law for different motives. We are not speaking of them today.

But it is all the more important constantly to help those in authority to be correctly oriented in the legislation which is in effect and to consider not only the "letter," but also the "spirit" of the law. A large reserve for the further raising of combat readiness and the strengthening of discipline and order can also be seen exactly in the correct employment of legal norms by all commanders and chiefs.

6367

CSO: 1801

CHIEF OF REAR SERVICES ON LIVING CONDITIONS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Army Gen S. K. Kurkotkin: "Concern for People--Our Party Duty"]

[Text] Hundreds of letters reach the editors of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA daily. Their authors touch on the most varied questions of combat training, service, and the daily life of units and subunits. Often, they also discuss the living conditions of the servicemen, their families, and favorable experience and shortcomings in this matter.

On the request of the editors, the Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR and Chief of Rear Services of the Soviet Armed Forces, Army General S. K. Kurkotkin, comments on this mail.

First of all, it is necessary to note the correctness of the opinions of the overwhelming majority of the newspaper's readers concerning the fact that the living condition of the troops is an important factor in their high combat readiness. The working efficiency and attitude of people and their success in soldierly labor depend to a great extent on how they are provided with housing, food, and clothing as well as medical service. This was mentioned with all definiteness at the army-wide conference on improving the troops' living conditions in a speech at it by member of the CPSU Central Committee's Politburo, Minister of Defense of the USSR, and Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov. To be concerned about satisfying the daily requirements of the personnel and members of servicemen's families is an obligation of each chief which is prescribed by the regulations and our lofty party duty.

It is pleasant to become acquainted with letters addressed to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA which reflect the fatherly concern of commanders and political officers for the living conditions of their subordinates and the skillful activity of the rear services which display initiative.

"We live in a remote taiga garrison," writes the wife of serviceman L. Dikalov, "but the organization of the public services and amenities on our

post is the equal of a big center. Modern residential buildings, an excellent Officers House, a stadium, and stores have sprung up here. Each new family receives an apartment and the children visit preschool institutions. Behind all this is the tremendous work of commanders, political officers, administrators, and the men themselves...."

I can only add that last year, for example, in such military districts as the Kiev, Belorussian, Carpathian, and Far East Districts and the Black Sea Fleet the military builders coped completely with the tasks for constructing housing and the public services and amenities of the military posts. Many garrisons received on-post gas, water, and electricity and hundreds of buildings were converted from furnace to central heating.

Judging from the mail to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, much has been done to realize the recommendations of the army-wide conference of the food and clothing supply services. Recently, there has been less unfavorable criticism of the rear area support of servicemen on exercises and of the work of officers' messes and coffee houses. I was pleased to read dozens of letters whose authors request that the military medical personnel be thanked for the restoration of health and the possibility to return to formation and to work.

The kitchen and galley farms in the units are receiving more and more development. "Last year," Lieutenant Colonel A. Makarov of the Leningrad Military District reports, "about 10 tons of meat were turned in for planned supply in the unit where Warrant Officer [praporshchik] V. Yasyuk is mess officer of the enlisted mess. The northern winter is now growing fierce outside the windows of the barracks but green onions, lettuce, and garlic which were grown in the hot-house appear on the dinner tables daily. A crop of cucumbers and tomatoes is expected in March."

Extended-service Junior Sergeant A. Klyzub also wrote about his kitchen farm. But here is what causes us to prick up our ears in his letter: how can the conduct of a composite farm be put right and where can the plan for a cowshed be obtained? It follows that the commendable initiative of the people still does not find the support of the corresponding local leaders in everything. Evidently, in the Kiev Military District from which this letter arrived as well as in others the available experience in running composite farms should be propagandized more actively and enthusiasts should be provided with the necessary documentation in good time.

By the way, we can have everything necessary, let us say, to ensure the good feeding of people but it will be bad nevertheless if the rules for preparing food are not observed and the cooks and ships cooks are not taught their difficult art. The letter of Junior Sergeant M. Kindrat, which the editors received from the Transcaucasus, forces us to ponder over this. You see, the boiler section where the junior sergeant serves was being repaired and they began to prepare the food in field kitchens. And its quality dropped at once and in the unit they began to forget about the proper setting of the soldiers' tables. But really, can the indicated circumstances excuse the responsible officials who are called upon to ensure the normal feeding of the

personnel under any conditions? It is believed that both the chief of the food supply service, Captain A. Gorbik, and the mess officer, Warrant Officer A. Parasochka, have already drawn the correct conclusions from what occurred. Such conclusions should also be drawn by other comrades who did not correct matters in time and did not check the work of their subordinates.

The editors' mail contains many criticisms about a shortage of heat in the housing. Such messages arrived from a commander of a military construction company, Lieutenant A. Pushkarev of the Transbaykal region, from the residential buildings which are serviced by the house management office No. 1 of the KECh [billeting unit] in Kostroma, from one of the garrisons of the Far East Military District, and from other places. Now, the majority of the shortcomings about which the readers wrote have been eliminated. But you see, many annoyances could have been avoided.

Judge for yourself. An emergency situation arose in a Far Eastern garrison because of interruptions in electrical supply. The pumps stopped, work in the boiler rooms came to a halt, and then the pipes burst. And only now have they decided to install mobile electric power plants in the garrison for insurance. One can ask, couldn't this measure really have been implemented ahead of time, without waiting for misfortune?

The barracks of the military builders from the Transbaykal are now well heated. For this, it was necessary to glass-in the windows, insulate the floors and walls, and replace the furnaces with individual steam-heat boilers. But really, couldn't the chief of the UNR [work supervisor's section], Engineer-Major V. Sapryga, and his subordinates--builders!--do all this in some way without "instructions" from Moscow? This means that we are speaking about the lack of normal concern for subordinates and of attention to their needs. A principled, party evaluation must be given to such facts.

Here, it should be kept in mind that there are no "minutia" in organizing the living conditions of people. The first sergeant was not sufficiently watchful, and we see a soldier in a crumpled, ill-fitting uniform. The activity of the finance service is poorly organized and, as Captain M. Damayev wrote to the editors, the servicemen cannot receive money for temporary duty or to go on leave in time. All these everyday messes affect the service of people and do not contribute to the strengthening of discipline and order in the units and subunits.

Specific difficulties are typical of remote and small garrisons. Not everything can be done in an hour here but, as they say, much is in our own hands. An activist of the women's council of one of the units wrote to the editors about the lack of bus transportation to the nearest rayon center. Now this question has been removed from the agenda: the bus is in operation. In another place, the children of servicemen could not get into a kindergarten. On the petition of the political organ, the local authorities allocated the needed number of places. So, it is important that the appropriate leaders "have time" for all this. Unfortunately, they do not always have the time.

The wife of Warrant Officer V. Knyah, for example, complains about the difficulties in obtaining bottled gas. Yes, the construction of a gas line to this settlement is not yet planned. But the delivery of bottles directly to the homes of the servicemen and relieving people of the inconveniences, of course, should be organized.

As we see, the overwhelming majority of everyday messes are by no means engendered by objective causes, but by the lack of administrative abilities of specific officials and a lack of initiative and attention to people. An uncompromising struggle against these shortcomings should be declared. The principled position of political and party organs and their assistance to commanders in improving the living conditions of the troops are especially important here. Ways to eliminate everything which hinders people in serving, working, and resting normally are often suggested by the authors of letters to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA themselves.

For example, Lieutenant Colonel (Reserve) I. Bavin reports about numerous new buildings of one garrison in the Carpathian Military District. By their own efforts the servicemen and members of their families built a store and soldiers' tea room, bath and vegetable storehouse, asphalted paths, and renovated the fence of the post on their Saturdays and Sundays of free work for the state. The letter's author names the initiators and organizers of the work, officers V. Saukh and N. Kravets and Warrant Officer G. Yusupev. If only we had a little more such initiative and organization of the matter!

A senior engineer of one of the organizations of the Northern Fleet, V. Smirnov, reports on the completion of the regular stage of the inspection competition for the best post and the best officers' dormitory. The units where officers P. Danilov and V. Len'shin serve and the dormitories which are managed by M. Makarova, D. Yushmanova, and L. Sinyagina were named the winners. A gratifying fact. The army-wide conference recommended that such inspection competitions also be conducted regularly where the proper attention is paid to their organization and the living conditions of the men become better and better arranged from year to year.

Thanks to the fatherly concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, our Armed Forces have everything necessary for combat training, service, and the daily life of the personnel and the servicemen's families. It is the duty of the commanders, political organs, and rear service organs to utilize material and financial resources efficiently, make available to the soldier, seaman, and officer everything prescribed, and ensure normal working and rest conditions for the people. The party and Komsomol organizations should constantly delve into these questions. The mail of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reminds all of us about all this once again.

6367

CSO: 1801

SCHOOLING AND PRIVILEGES: REPLIES TO READERS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Mar 80 p 4

[Reply to letters on military and DOSAAF schools by N. I. Makeyev, editor in chief of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA]

[Text] How to Become a Suvorov or Nakhimov Cadet

The editors receive many letters in which the readers request a discussion of the rules for acceptance in the Suvorov Military School and the Nakhimov Naval School. Comrades V. Grigor'yev of Molodechno, A. Mikroshnichenko of Taganrog, N. Ogala of Neftekamsk, and others are making such a request.

We satisfy their wish today.

Boys 15-16 years of age who have completed the eighth grade are accepted in the Suvorov Military School (SVU) and Nakhimov Naval School (NVMU). In this case, the 15th birthday should be reached no later than 31 September of the year of entry. No one is accepted in the 10th grade of the schools.

Documents necessary for entering the schools are drawn up through the rayon military commissariat for the place of residence. An exception is the groups of Soviet forces where documents are submitted through command channels to the unit (large unit) commander or chief of installation.

Applications for acceptance are submitted by parents or those substituting for them during the period from 1 through 25 June. The following documents are appended to the application: the personal application of the boy addressed to the head of the school concerning his desire to study in the Suvorov (Nakhimov) school and subsequently to become an officer; birth certificate (original); proof of eighth-grade education; reference signed by the class supervisor and school principal; Komsomol testimonial issued by the school Komsomol committee (for Komsomols); medical findings on the state of health and suitability for study in a Suvorov (Nakhimov) school and issued by the military medical commission with the military commissariat or garrison

military medical commission; two photographs 3 x 4 centimeters in size; a certificate concerning the place of work or nature of labor activity of the parents or those substituting for them.

According to existing rules, one can enter only the Suvorov Military School closest to place of residence. Each oblast, kray, and republic is allocated places only in certain SVU's. It should also be kept in mind that the selection of the school depends on the foreign language being studied.

The Kiev SVU accepts boys who have studied English, German, or Spanish in school; the Minak, Moscow, Sverdlovsk, and Ussuri schools--English or German; and the Kazan' and Leningrad schools--English or French. In the Nakhimov Naval School--English.

Acceptance in the SVU takes place from 1 through 15 August (in the Kalinin and Moscow SVU's in 1985-- from 15 through 29 August), and in the Nakhimov Naval School--from 15-30 July. Arriving at the schools, the candidates undergo a final medical examination and take competitive entrance examinations in mathematics (written and oral), Russian language (dictation) for the volume of an eight-grade school program, and in physics (oral) in the eight-grade program (section on "Mechanics").

Boys who have completed the eighth grade of school with excellent grades (except for singing and drawing) take only one examination at the discretion of the school's head. If they receive a grade of "excellent," they are freed from taking further examinations, and on receiving a grade of "good" or "satisfactory" they take the remaining examination on a level with the other candidates.

Graduates of the Suvorov Military and Nakhimov Naval Schools are sent by the heads of the SVU's and NVMU's for further study in accordance with the established allocation, as a rule to command schools. In determining the military schools for subsequent instruction, consideration is given to the level of general-educational, military (naval), and physical training of the Sukhorov and Nakhimov graduates, their professional and moral qualities, discipline, and state of health.

Information on other questions connected with entering SVU's and NVMU's can be obtained in the rayon military commissariats at the place of residence.

Privileges for Students at DOSAAF Schools

Our readers S. Sotnikov, N. Rubanov, V. Kucherenko, and others request us to tell about the privileges which are granted to youths who are sent by the military commissariats to DOSAAF organizations for the training of specialists for the Soviet Armed Forces.

In accordance with Article 18 of the Soviet law, "On the Universal Military Obligation," specialists are trained for the Soviet Armed Forces in DOSAAF

educational organizations and educational institutions of the system for vocational and technical education each year. Youths who have reached their 17th birthday are called upon to undergo this training in the established order.

In the cities, the training of specialists for the Soviet Armed Forces is accomplished without separation from production. A reduced length of work day is established for the youths for the period of training as applicable to the rules envisaged by legislation in force for workers and employees who are studying in the schools for working youth. They are granted 7-15 work days of leave for the time to prepare for and take the examinations (depending on the specialty and the extent of the training programs) with the maintenance of average wage for the basic place of work.

In rural rayons, the training of the indicated specialists can be accomplished with separation from production at assemblies in the fall-winter period. The place of employment is maintained and 90 percent of the mean wage for the place of work is paid for draftees who are selected for training with separation from production for the entire period of instruction including travel time to and from the place of instruction if this is connected with travel from the place of permanent residence. Kolkhozes, enterprises, institutions, and organizations in which predraftees are permanently employed pay expenses to rent housing for them for the period of the assemblies and also the cost of travel to and from the place of instruction.

Attendance at lessons by draftees selected by military commissariats for training in military specialties is mandatory.

The calculation of the mean wage for workers, employees, and kolkhoz workers is accomplished in accordance with legislation in effect.

6367

780: 1941

SIGNAL UNIT: TRAINING DEFICIENCIES NOTED

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 6 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Maj N. Belyayev: "But the Indicators Are Different" with follow-up report of 17 Apr 80]

[Text] The tactical-special exercises which summed up the results of the first three months of the winter training period ended. The best results were demonstrated by the subunit commanded by Senior Lieutenant A. Korotkov. All combat-training missions and standards were worked out here with high quality. Even the young specialists who recently arrived in the unit functioned confidently as crew members and accomplishing various special situations. And there were many of them. At the tensest period of combat work, for example, radio chiefs and specialists who ensure communications "were put out of action." They were replaced by drivers, Junior Sergeant V. Sherstnev, Private First Class N. Krol, and other men who had mastered allied specialties of radio telegraphers. In this regard, many of them operated in accordance with first- and second-class standards.

Complete interchangeability in the crews, their cohesiveness, and the high level of ability of each radio telegrapher as well as an ardent striving to accomplish socialist obligations completely ensured success. In accordance with the results of three months of winter combat training, the subunit was again awarded first place in the socialist competition.

Alongside Korotkov's subordinates worked the men of the subunit commanded by Senior Lieutenant V. Botov. If we take each of the specialists separately, they are not inferior to their rivals in the competition in their skill. However, on the exercises they operated in far from the best manner. This was felt on the initial stage when the subunit left the unit area, during the march, and especially when setting up the radios. Not one crew was able to accomplish the combat-training mission errorlessly.

Some of the comrades tried to explain the poor teamwork of the crews by the fact that here the officer personnel were completely new. They say that even Senior Lieutenant Botov assumed his post recently. However, he took over the subunit prior to the start of the winter training period. Three

months of training is not a short period. During this time, in addition to the lessons on which the signalmen's individual skills were improved many drills were conducted on the teamwork of crews and platoons. But the methodological level in working out these problems was far from the same in both subunits.

Senior Lieutenant Korotkov saw to it that complete crews functioned on field lessons. He usually assigned the specialists of one station to details on duties within the unit. The working out of the standards was skillfully organized here. The officer required the quality performance of all elements separately initially by each radio telegrapher, and then the standard as a whole.

But then, Senior Lieutenant Botov proceeded differently: he assigned radio telegraphers from different crews to a detail. And what was the result? A radio crew is small; therefore, the absence of one specialist has an immediate effect on the quality accomplishment of the standards.

Now, let us analyze the lesson schedule. If Korotkov worked out completely all subjects planned for the month, Botov only worked out 87 percent of them. Just why did this happen? In preparing the schedule, Senior Lieutenant Botov coordinated it poorly with the unit's monthly plan for combat and political training. Therefore, the sequence for increasing knowledge and skills in special training did not show through in the schedule quite clearly.

"You can't foresee and consider everything in the schedule," he pleaded when the senior commander did not approve one of them. "Special situations will follow without fail...."

Special situations reach Senior Lieutenant Botov more often than other commanders. Why? Again, for the reason that he is not always in tune with the planning. Let us say, recently he had to transfer work on communication equipment from the radio range to the classrooms because he did not look at the schedule for use of the training center in time. And another subunit was engaged there this day.

But why was a lagging collective found alongside an outstanding subunit? First of all, because Senior Lieutenant Botov is noticeably inferior to officer Korotkov as an organizer and methodologist. But who hampers him in studying and using Korotkov's experience? It is believed that Botov's immediate superior also failed to do everything to help him in mastering leading experience in organizing the training process and competition. For example, when summing up results he named the winners and praised them, and then he stated the standard phrase which he directed to Botov to the effect that the latter should bear down. There was no mention of just what is meant by "bearing down" or why the collective is marking time. Unfortunately, neither did several unit staff officers who worked in both subunits delve deeply into why they had different indicators in combat training and competition.

Recently, a display appeared in the unit club on which photographs of the leading officers were placed and with a brief description of their experience and procedure in training and indoctrination. There is also a story about Senior Lieutenant Korotkov. His experience is often discussed at service conferences. However, the effectiveness of this work is not high enough. Why? It is believed, primarily because it is difficult to transmit the essence of experience, all its facets and nuances, in this manner. In such cases something always slips from the field of view and, at times, something extremely essential.

As life shows, the greatest value is had by the study of experience directly on the spot, in the leading subunit. Senior Lieutenant Korotkov should have invited his neighbors to a lesson and Botov, casting aside pride, should have responded to this invitation. For example, he would have seen what is the integrated method for training signalmen which was introduced into practice by Senior Lieutenant Korotkov and his subordinate officers.

Familiarity with the training-material base in the leading subunit would also have been useful for Botov. The rationalizers headed by Senior Lieutenant Korotkov created a classroom which makes it possible not only to improve the individual ability of the radio telegraphers but also to train drivers to take the test for a rating in an allied specialty.

Can the laggards be pulled up to the level of the best subunit? Unquestionably. All possibilities are present for this, and they must be realized.

Follow-up Report

"But the Indicators Are Different...." This was the title of a report by Major I. Belyayev which was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA this 6 March. It discussed the unsatisfactory organization of the training process and socialist competition in a subunit commanded by Senior Lieutenant V. Botov.

As the chief of the unit's political section reported to the editors, the report was discussed in the headquarters and political section. Specific measures were planned and implemented to improve the organization of the training process and competition. Shortcomings in work on propagandizing and introducing leading experience have been eliminated.

Senior Lieutenant V. Botov was given assistance in raising the methodological level of lessons and drills and in organizing competition for tasks and standards under field conditions. For this purpose, staff officers Major A. Kholmov and Captain N. Zadunev worked in the subunit.

Indicators of the subunit's personnel in training and competition have improved considerably now.

6367

CSO: 1801

PERSONNEL: SPECIALIST SELECTION PROBLEM DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Col Med Serv V. Borovikov: "Who Should Be an Operator"]

[Text] Everything was ready for the start of the lessons with the young soldiers. The newcomers became acquainted with the equipment and armament, visited the work sites, and attended a drill where the men of various specialties demonstrated their skill. Soon the newcomers themselves would begin to master the combat equipment. But first, they had to pass a unique examination.

First, a talk is conducted with each soldier. The chairman of the commission, Lieutenant Colonel V. Koval'chuk, a political officer, an engineer, the unit medical officer, and other members of the commission are interested in many things: how the soldier studied in school or worked at a plant or in a kolhoz, what kinds of sport attract him, and so forth. Then the newcomer is given an exercise with a test. And then he mentally moves over a diagram along a winding, intricate line, past complicated "paths." They must not be confused and he must not jump from one to another.

A new assignment is more difficult: the test contains a logic task and it must be accomplished in a limited time. And then, assignments again and again....

The officers attentively follow the actions of the soldiers and their reactions. The psychophysiological characteristic of the man is gradually formed. One is concentrated, collected, joins in the work at once, and performs it accurately and assiduously. Another is distracted, excessively nervous, and becomes lost in an unexpected situation.

The results of the talks, observations, and grades for performance of the tests will be scrupulously analyzed and discussed, and the commander will make a final decision: which military specialty it is more expedient for the newcomer to master. Of course, there are special requirements for those who will become an operator.

Thus, a psychophysiological selection which has become an important element in the struggle to intensify the training process of the National Air Defense Forces is conducted in the N-th unit. It permits disclosing the professional abilities of a person and the special features of his mind, and it has him face namely that goal with the attainment of which his capabilities are most completely realized. Time will show how this will occur in practice and what effect the psychophysiological selection will provide.

The continuous improvement of combat equipment and weapons and the development of the methods of armed conflict dictate the urgent necessity for a further intensification of the training process and searches for and the introduction of promising forms and methods of instruction into practice. However, the use of these forms and methods provides the greatest impact in the case where commanders, in organizing training, give comprehensive consideration to the psychophysiological features of the specialists--their volitional tempering, temperament, intellect, emotional stability, and ability to withstand large psychological loads in varied stress situations. This is determined by the fact that under contemporary conditions the combat activity of the specialists in many combat arms is connected primarily with the performance of operator functions.

The soldier-operator should be able to accomplish tasks connected with the search for and recognition of signals, the analysis and processing of information, and the realization of data obtained from a computer. In which regard, under conditions of strong psychological and emotional influences. In addition, he is required to maintain a high level of readiness to make decisions and accomplish extreme actions with prolonged, monotonous processes, let us say, in cases where sparse signals of useful information appear against a background of continuous jamming. Clearly, the growth in the professional skill of the men will depend to a great degree on their intellectual abilities and the special features of their mind.

The correct professional orientation of the servicemen which is obtained as a result of the psychophysiological selection is an important, but not the only, element which contributes to the disclosure and, subsequently, to the development of the necessary abilities and psychological stability in the specialists.

Under conditions of high nervous-emotional stresses it is very important to be able to make timely employment of methods which reduce emotional tension and increase the efficiency of the specialists. Military medical personnel render great assistance to commanders in this matter. Investigating the actions of the serviceman in various difficult situations and analyzing the reactions which occur in his organism, they provide recommendations on how to increase the load in the process of combat improvement, which exercises should be used for physical hardening, and how better to organize the personnel's rest. All this reduces the fatigue of people to a considerable degree and develops "immunity" to distraction.

The specific activity of an operator who is performing combat duty, conducting missile firings, and under other conditions which approximate actual combat often takes place in a situation where extreme situations are created. Here the memory and thinking of the specialists are subjected to a strong, negative influence, as a result of which they may reduce combat activity and commit errors. Experienced commanders consider this special feature properly.

Deep relaxation of emotional tension is provided by so-called autogenic drill which is a special complex of exercises of the nervous system. In the course of combat training, it is receiving wider and wider employment and helps the specialists to control their own emotions, to train the memory and will, and it furthers the concentration of attention.

However, this method can be used only under the supervision of a physician who has taken a course of special training. Goals which are incorrectly posed for oneself in the period of such drills and the incorrect accomplishment of the exercises lead to negative results.

It is also necessary to keep in mind the fact that the serviceman, in beginning autogenic drills, must master its goals and tasks well and acquire a certain psychological attitude. It is better if only those who so desire first undertake it. Senior Lieutenant of Medical Service V. Ryabtsev, for example, began drilling in the N-th unit with a group consisting of only eight people. In a short time, when the first positive results became known, the number of those desiring to participate grew.

Officer Ryabtsev's initiative received the approval and support of the senior commanders. His experience is used in many troop collectives. And in one of the units, a special classroom for the conduct of autogenic drills has been set up under the supervision of Senior Lieutenant of Medical Service B. Dudka. The progressive method is finding followers among missilemen and aviators, radar operators, and signalmen.

It is now becoming a rule for the commander, in planning drill where the men are to experience great psychological loads, to consult with the military physician about which factors should be considered here and which work must first be conducted with the personnel. And this is understandable. Not knowing properly a person's psychophysiological features and not being able to create favorable conditions for the realization of all his latent possibilities, it is difficult to count on success in training.

I recall a talk with the commander of a surface-to-air missile battalion. The officer complained that under difficult situations individual men lose their self-control, display nervousness, and tire quickly. Really, it is as if the professional skill of these specialists reached some barrier which they cannot overcome. "Many soldiers and sergeants have begun to engage in physical training and sports more intensively, but this has little effect on the results," the battalion commander relates. "Perhaps the people have reached the limit of their capabilities."

Unquestionably, this is not so. As is known, human capabilities are very great. It is another thing that favorable conditions are not always created in which these capabilities can be manifested and improved. This is what happened in this battalion. In the course of the drills, the commander gave little consideration to the psychophysiological peculiarities of the men. By the way, the lessons in physical training themselves included the very same exercises for all the men. But you see, the specific nature of the work, let us say, of a launcher crew man, electrician, or operator is not the same. They experience emotional influences and physical and psychological loads differently. So, for each of them there should be a strictly individual approach to the tempering of his body and nervous system, too. And this special feature was not considered in the subunit, either.

I had the occasion to hear many times the statements of staff officers to the effect that in the period of final checks many specialists operate extremely wastefully on the equipment and make many uneconomical movements. The shortcoming is not as minor as may appear at first glance. Seconds often decide the outcome of an engagement. And it is exactly clear, most economical actions which require the least expenditures of energy and permit creating a supply of these seconds. How is this attained? The most important here depends on the initial conditions in which one or another skill begins to be molded.

The physiological basis of a skill, according to scientist I. P. Pavlov, is composed of a strengthened system of ties--some dynamic stereotype which originates in a specific psychological "atmosphere." Therefore, it is recommended that lessons and drills be structured in such a way that from the very beginning of their service the specialists would generate stable skills and habits which require the least expenditures of energy. How a young soldier "settles into" the work site and coordinates his actions with the use of the regulatory organs, how he distributes his attention and reacts to instrument readings, to signals and commands--all this should be the object of a thorough analysis of the lesson leader. If a man's errors are not corrected in time, nervous actions quickly develop into stable habits of which it is difficult to get rid subsequently.

The correct fitting of the work site, the well thought-out arrangement of instruments and reference tables, and effective illumination raise the accuracy of actions significantly and reduce fatigue. It is not by chance that scientists, designers, and specialists from the troops are devoting more and more attention to human factors questions and technical aesthetics.

But now, I should like to return to the beginning of the conversation. A year has passed since the psychophysiological selection which was conducted in the N-th unit, and it is possible to evaluate its results and draw conclusions. In training leading specialists, and first of all operators, the screening was reduced three to four-fold and the times for their training were reduced by 20-30 percent. Naturally, a clearly organized training process was ensured here. Lieutenant Colonel Koval'chuk also notes that

economic expenditures were reduced significantly in training operators and other specialists.

Just as high results were also obtained in other units where the psycho-physiological selection was conducted in a qualified manner, with the observance of necessary rules. Isn't this the best proof of its high effectiveness?

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CSO: 1801

POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION: IN THE BELORUSSIAN MILITARY DISTRICT

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Col Gen A. Debalyuk, member of military council, chief of political directorate of Red Banner Belorussian Military District: "A Matter for All and Each One"]

[Text] In any matter, it is useful to look fixedly at what has already been accomplished, make a critical interpretation of the work which has been done, introduce the necessary adjustments in it, and plan further prospects. This goal was also pursued by the district's military council which, at its session, discussed the course of implementation of the CPSU Central Committee's Decree, "On further improvement of ideological and political-indoctrinational work."

There is no need to say how great is the significance of this party document for the communist indoctrination of the servicemen. In accomplishing its demands as well as the recommendations of the all-union conference of ideological workers, the party organizations achieved noticeable successes in the indoctrination of the personnel.

I will take as an example the Rogachev Guards Motorized Rifle Division imeni the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet as an example. Strictly speaking, where did they start here and what was regarded as of paramount importance? In reflecting on how to raise the scientific level, on how to improve efficiency and specificity, the tie of propaganda and agitation with life, and raise their offensive spirit, in the division they proceeded from the basis that much depends specifically on the propagandists. This is why the most fixed attention was devoted to work with propagandist personnel and ideological activists.

With the participation of officers of the political directorate, the large unit's political section conducted a number of extremely useful theoretical and practical-scientific conferences and methodological seminars. The units began to conduct regular group and individual consultations for unofficial propagandists and agitators and surveys of political and military literature. They also thought here about how to increase the effectiveness of the activity of the reference-information center and the methodological offices.

Unquestionably, work with the ideological activists improved. But, you see, this by itself is not what interests us, but rather its results. What is the use, let us say, if more conferences and seminars are conducted for propagandists but the presentations of many of them repeat previous shortcomings--academic, poorly reasoned, not very timely, uninteresting?

It can be said that this is one of the most important problems. But it is still missed in some places. It would be incorrect to hope for an automatic return from measures conducted with the propagandists and undertake nothing further. It is necessary to place the struggle for the quality of ideological work at all its stages under strict control. In the Rogachev Division, such control is being accomplished more and more successfully. Let us turn to the same lecture propaganda. First, here they see that the prepared lectures were discussed in agitation-propaganda groups and the agitation and propaganda collective. For when the discussion is already under way one can obtain an impression of how the propagandist is working on the material and what he takes with him to the rostrum and can caution him against possible errors.

But they do not limit themselves to this. They decided to become interested in the responses of the audience more often and not as randomly as was done formerly, to generalize the listeners' opinions, and to draw practical conclusions from them.

The fruits from this approach and this work style are already evident. We generalized the experience of the Rogachev units and disseminated it in the district.

The district's political directorate accomplished a number of measures to improve the training of propagandist personnel. Several corrections were introduced in the organization of assemblies of ideological personnel, as a result of which their saturation with information was increased. Each month, we conduct small-group seminars with organizational propagandists on which we inform them about the urgent problems in the policy of the CPSU, about events in the country and abroad, and we examine questions of military organizational development. We prepared printed materials about the leading experience of propagandist activity.

Unfortunately, today we cannot say that high scientific character, a close tie with life, specificity, efficiency, and clearness in content and form have become a mandatory element of each ideological measure everywhere. In some units, outwardly-intensive political-indoctrinational work is not having increasing influence on all aspects of the collectives' life and the behavior of the servicemen. There still are many mass political measures and lessons on political training which take place dully, uninterestingly, and conventionally.

Officers of the political directorate encountered such shortcomings working in the unit where the propagandist is Major Ter-Akopov. Here, it can be said, an old disease was discovered where the accomplishment of ideological

tasks is conceived only through an increase in quantitative indicators in indoctrination work. In this regard, we were convinced once again how difficult it is to smash settled psychology and what a difficult process it is to shift the center of gravity to quality criteria.

It was planned to work out 27 lectures in the unit for the winter period of this training year. Isn't that a bit too much for a regiment? But that's not all. The preparation of the lectures lay on a narrow circle of propagandists. The leader of the agitation and propaganda group himself, Major S. Yurkevich, assumed work which was beyond his capabilities--to work out six lectures in a short time. Major E. Ter-Akonov and Lieutenant Colonel N. Tishin were each to prepare their presentations on four subjects. At the same time, the majority of the agitation and propaganda group members did not receive such assignments at all. The leader of the unofficial propagandists had a rather simple explanation for this: so many accumulated texts are laying there in the cabinet--just take one and present it....

It is hardly necessary to state that such an approach to the assigned matter cannot be tolerated. This is how formalism is implanted in propaganda and its low quality is predetermined. In this connection, it is important to stress the necessity for a decisive and objective struggle against any manifestations of sluggishness in the thinking of the organizers of ideological work, inertness, and undemandingness toward oneself and others.

Unquestionably, it is necessary to improve methods for the analysis of organizational and ideological work for the successful accomplishment of such a task. Let us say directly that a style is still viable where the checking comrades base their evaluations only on an analysis of the plans, subject matter, and in the best case--the texts of prepared lectures. But how much of what has been planned in fact really became a good lecture, talk, or report? What caused the men's interest, and left a deep trace, and what passed without leaving a trace for them? Which measure was formal, dry, and impassive, and which was distinguished by genuine party fervor, offensiveness, and great emotional force? It is clear that a superficial acquaintance with the status of ideological indoctrination in one collective or another will not provide an answer to such questions. This is why the problem of improving the analysis of ideological activity was discussed with all thoroughness in the political directorate. This also pertained to the criteria of its completeness, quality, effectiveness, nature of the information reaching us from the troops, and work methods of the officers in the political directorate and the political sections in the units.

All those who participate in the organization of the political indoctrination of the men should be taught the art of analytical work. Recently, for example, the following fact was encountered. Visiting a political lesson, the unit propagandist reduced his remarks addressed to the group leaders primarily to shortcomings in the maintaining of record journals but did not call attention to serious omissions in the content and procedure of the lessons. His inability to see errors, generalize the favorable and unfavorable, and draw practical conclusions had an effect. In another case the secretary of

the party committee could judge extremely approximately whether an integrated approach to the organization of indoctrination had been ensured, what gaps were present and where, and so forth. One more serious problem in the training of personnel stands behind these facts.

Yes, the key figure in ideological work is a person who comes to the men with the party word and who organizes the indoctrination process. Therefore, the activity of the propagandists and the ideological activists should properly be at the center of attention of the political organs. In this connection, we cannot fail to say several words about common political education days. They are an important form of participation of the leader personnel in the indoctrination of the masses. However, in some places, formalism in the conduct of common political education days is beginning to be manifested. Individual comrades are avoiding participation in them, considering that it is "undignified" for them to appear before a small company or battery audience. It is hardly necessary to state that such a position discredits the very idea of conducting common political education days: to make contact between the leaders and the men in the subunits regular.

Recently, we have done much to improve lecture propaganda and oral political agitation. But nevertheless, we are not completely satisfied with what has been done. The quality of many lectures, reports, and other measures leaves much to be desired. Some of the comrades are getting rid of habitual notions, hackneyed cliches, and sluggish thinking slowly, too slowly. In a certain sense, our shortfalls are being supplemented by the shortfalls of the military schools and academies where, in our opinion, the officer candidates and students could be taught the art of political work more effectively. It is believed that the Military Publishing House would do something important if it published a popular textbook on the problems of propagandist skill to assist the ideological activists. But the main thing, of course, is that we ourselves must struggle still more persistently, each one on the assigned sector, for ideological depth and combat offensiveness of the word addressed to people. For the wealth of content and clear form of our indoctrinational measures. For broad political erudition of the propagandists, lofty style of speech, and the ability to stir up others with the fire of our own conviction. Otherwise, in the future we will also have to encounter instances where propagandists who are unable to present thoughts logically and are unable to captivate and convince will "keep their word."

It will soon be a year since the decree of the CPSU Central Committee on ideological questions was published. It is appropriate to recall that it is a program intended for the long term, and a year is just that line which obliges us to evaluate the first results with all exactingness. The political directorate is also directing the political organs, political workers, and party organizations toward such a critical, comprehensive, and specific analysis and toward a persistent struggle for a further improvement in ideological and political-indoctrinational work.

6367
CSO: 1801

MISSILE AND RADAR UNITS: TRAINING ACTIVITIES

Missile Battalion Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Mar 80 p 1

[Article by Capt A. Lazarev, Siberian Military District: "The Victors"]

[Text] The secretary of the Komsomol organization of the air defense missile battalion, Sr Lt Anatoliy Mel'nik, was nervous: The missilenen were expecting guests. The evening before the commander had said:

"I hope that the Komsomol will not let us down. A great honor has been shown to us...."

This is what the battalion commander had in mind: The Komsomol organization had been awarded the temporary Red Banner of the Komsomol obkom, which had been established for the winners in the competition dedicated to the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birthday. And now they were waiting in the unit for a delegation whose composition included young metallurgists, miners, chemists, and transport workers. Many of them had gone through the school of army service and now they head Komsomol youth brigades and shifts.

While the missilenen were taking their places in the formation and the commander was preparing to report, the secretary recalled the most significant events which had recently taken place in the life of the Komsomol organization. There were quite a few of them; however, the main ones could be seen particularly clearly.

... The range encountered heavy cold. The low temperatures were not unusual for Siberians, but even they began to fret: Will they be able to prepare the equipment in a compressed time and fire at targets? However, they were able to prepare the complex for operations and checked its functioning in a timely fashion. The eyes of the guidance officer, Engr. Sr Lt Vladimir Makogonyuk, closed from tiredness; however, when the target blip lit up on the screen, he reacted in an instant. They knocked down the small high-speed winged target with the first missile.

They also hit the second target with sharpshooter accuracy. This was a Komsomol gift to the commander on his birthday. Everyone except the battalion commander was at a line firing for the first time. Makogonyuk is now considered an experienced specialist and has been advanced in position and rank, but at that time the young officer, just as the others in the battalion, was just beginning the school of live missile launches. However, they do not say for nothing that any deed is done by man, and man -- is famous for the deed....

The missilemen returned from the range with a sense of fulfilled duty. Nevertheless, the question of completely using reserves was raised at the next Komsomol meeting. The commander of a progressive platoon, Lt Yevgeniy Ardashkin had assumed the obligation of teaching Jr Sgt Aleksandr Vasil'kov to perform the duties of an officer. Lt. Sergey Romanovskiy had certified that he would teach his subordinates in a very short time to detect targets earlier and work them under jamming conditions.

The search for reserves had seized all the battalion's specialists. The vehicle technician, WO [praporshchik] Nikolay Gulin learned to work as part of the crew. Engr. Lt Aleksandr Krasnukhin conducts classes in the technical circle and provides consultations. The launch personnel achieved the performance of daytime norms during night combat operations. The slogans: "To work in an allied specialty just as in a primary one!" and "You yourself know how -- teach your comrades!", were consolidated in the life of the Komsomol organization. The call which was born at the range: "The detection -- further, the tracking -- accurate, the launch -- destructive!" was close to each one here.

However, good initiatives, if they are not strengthened with deeds, will remain good wishes. So that this did not happen, competition was organized during each class between the specialists. Thus for example, a complicated program for the radar operators was made up for the simulation equipment. A complete series of possible combat operation variants is practiced for one hour. After a short break during which a critique of the crews' actions is conducted, the conditions for duelling with aerial targets are modelled again. Here the Komsomol members are the commander's first assistants.

The high effectiveness of the classes, the strict check on the carrying out of obligations, the desire of the missilemen to become experts in their jobs -- all this is reinforced by day-to-day Komsomol work. The reports of Komsomol members are regularly listened to during a session of the Komsomol committee and in the Komsomol organizations of the batteries. Questions about strengthening their influence on the troop collective's life and training are discussed during meetings.

Fighting men of 12 nationalities serve in the battalion. Vladimir Purbuyev, a Buryat, is friends with Bakitzhan Turkeyev, an Uzbek. Driver Semen Kuz'mich, who was called to service from Belorussia, found a comrade from the Volga -- Jr Sgt Yevgeniy Maksimov. The missilemen live together as friends. This, however, does not prevent them from criticizing each other's

slightest shortcoming during Komsovol meetings. They think that there should be no shortcomings at all. One has given his word -- be able to keep it! The Komsovol organization has been recognized as a progressive one -- this means that it must be that way indeed, without any reductions.

The snow which had fallen during the night crunched under their feet. The delegation of young production workers halts in front of the formation. The Red Banner takes fire under the rays of the sun and its light lies on the faces of the missilemen. In their eyes are emotion, pride, and the entire gamut of emotions which one cannot fail to experience when the scarlet banner with the depiction of great Lenin is deployed in the wind before the formation.

Missile Battery Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Mar 80 p 1

[Article by Maj V. Kotov, a battalion chief of staff: "Demonstration Classes in a Battery"]

[Text] Scattered clouds sail over the gently rolling plain which extends to the horizon. They cover the sun for an instant and then the snow seemingly turns grey and does not blind one's eyes so. A freezing wind is coming from a hollow covered with widely spaced bushes, but the missilemen do not notice this. Their faces are animated. Drawn up not far from the missile mounts, the officers, warrant officers [praporshchiki], sergeants, and soldiers are observing with interest and even with jealousy the actions of their comrades.

There are demonstration classes today in the battery which Capt V. Tsvetkov, a specialist firstclass, commands. The need to conduct them had been caused by a number of reasons. Based on the results of the last training year, the missile battalion achieved the title of "excellent." However, soon after this several officers -- crew chiefs -- had been promoted to higher positions. In their place came young lieutenants. Many experienced specialists, whom young fighting men replaced, had been released into the reserves.

It was necessary to teach the men in a very short time to work on the equipment in an excellent manner -- and under more complicated conditions than before. The demands on the missilemen's special and technical training had grown.

This is why a course aimed at having the experience of the best specialists become the property of everyone, had been adopted from the first days of the training year. For this purpose, courses of instruction with the gunners, computer operators, surveyors, and meteorologists were conducted in the battalion using the staff officers. They went from the simple to the complex. They invariably combined the theoretical part of the material with a practical demonstration. When doing this, special attention was

paid to developing a single method for training the launch crew chiefs of which there were three -- Lts S. Chebotarev, U. Kruglov, and V. Kislukhin-- who were just beginning their service as officers.

It was immediately ascertained that theoretical training and the ability to think creatively distinguished the young officers, but they lacked practical skills. Lt V. Kruglov at first experienced difficulties in the most -- apparently -- simple situations. When checking on the correctness of the subordinates' actions, the lieutenant rushed about from one to another; he wanted to be on time everywhere. At times, he became nonplussed when it was necessary to determine and eliminate breakdowns in equipment quickly.

One of the better trained instructional methodologists -- Capt I. Klyunnikov -- helped him and Lt V. Kislukhin. He did not reproach them for a mistake and he did not hurry in explaining why it had occurred. It was as if the captain by his sound leading questions drew the young crew chiefs to a self-critical analysis of what had happened and to correct conclusions. And how satisfied the lieutenants were when they succeeded in understanding a truth completely on their own! In this case, the same mistake was not repeated, and knowledge and skill were dependably strengthened.

There were quite a few of these small but very important victories by the lieutenants. Their confidence in their strengths and instructional methods skill grew from day to day. Now, the young officers, as they say, are finding their hand in combat work. However, of course, they still cannot be up to the best crew chief, Sr Lt A. Martynov.

Lt V. Kruglov and his friends want very much to pull themselves up to the recognized expert. Solid experience is on Martynov's shoulders. He knows in detail where it is possible to shorten time, and in what operations one should in no way hurry.

However, once an incident, which became a life-long lesson for him, happened to Senior Lieutenant Martynov. It was this: Martynov had loudly given a command to the crew during one of the training sessions. However, the articulation let the officer down in the cold. His voice, so to say, "sat down", and as a result the specialists incorrectly understood the officer and set the sight setting inaccurately. Since nothing like this had ever happened before and the operation had always been carried out irreproachably, neither the crew chief nor the battery commander attached importance to this and did not check the sight setting personally. Had it happened during a live firing, the error would have had serious consequences. But now a low rating threatened the entire battalion. A missile is a crew-served weapon and inaccuracy in the work of any specialist cancels out the efforts of the entire crew.

From that memorable day, they changed somewhat the performance of a number of operations in the battalion. They made checks stricter. Now, if someone makes an error during the training process, it immediately becomes

known who made it and in what step. The main thing, the battalion commander thought, is to jointly find a method for conducting a class on preparing a missile for launch in which all operations would be checked twice.

Today, battery personnel are demonstrating this repeatedly tested combat work model. Both Captain Tavetkov and crew chiefs Sr Lt A. Martynov and Lt S. Chebotarev are working with great enthusiasm. Equal to the officers, all crew members are operating just as correctly and accurately.

In observing their comrades, Lieutenants Kruglov and Kialukhin are learning from them. The young officers realize that such teamwork is possible only where people have mastered to perfection not only their duties but also are able at any moment to replace a comrade. Valuable seconds are saved by dexterous and rapid work in removing the cover from the missile and by combining several operations that are permitted by the manual. When the time comes to set the final missile flight parameters, the specialists carefully fill out the technical documents, and check and recheck the accuracy of the data obtained. A double-check prevents the possibility of error.

... The demonstration class is over. What effect did it have, how were the young missilemen enriched? Here is how Lt V. Kruglov answers: "It was very interesting and useful. We seemingly checked ourselves with a double-check. We tried not to omit a single movement, a single instruction from Lieutenant Martynov. His work is the height to which we must raise ourselves." The other missilemen also gave a high rating to the demonstration class.

Training Procedures in AD Units

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen I. Stopnikov: "The Springs of Initiative"]

[Text] It is well known that socialist competition affects both the actions and hearts of people -- under the conditions, of course, that its organizers approach the task with initiative and creativity and contribute to the transformation of difficult military work into inspired work which gives happiness and deep satisfaction and which improves one's personality. Both its results and its effect on improving fighting men morally depend to a large degree on the competition organizers, especially the commanders.

Not so long ago it was necessary to analyze the following case: For a long time the N-skaya unit had not been noted for any special successes in competition. However, the regimental commander is changed and after some time the level of the man's training noticeably grew and organization and discipline were increased. What were the sources of the positive improvements? Both the former and the new commander were officers trained in instructional methods, they had an excellent knowledge of the equipment and their experience was the same. The methods used by them in the training and indoctrination of subordinates were seemingly the same. The whole matter, apparently was in a different approach to the leadership of competition. The first

commander boiled it down mainly to having the men adopt obligations in a timely fashion and reporting them to higher headquarters, but the second displays creativity, arouses people to initiative and searches, and skillfully relies on the party and Komsomol organizations.

Creativity in the leadership of competition How should it be displayed, what are its criteria? It is evident that simple answers do not exist for these questions. For example, what permits the commander of an excellent air defense missile unit, Lt Col V. Alimov, to mobilize subordinates for the qualitative performance of combat training tasks and invariably achieve successes? High competency, personal example in mastering equipment and the methods for its combat employment? Undoubtedly, it is these. The ability to organize the training and indoctrination process and competition accurately? Yes, this is typical of the unit commander's work style. The fact that Lieutenant Colonel Alimov, the political section, and the unit's staff continuously maintain a healthy spirit of exactingness and an atmosphere of creative research and initiative in the collective, also has large significance.

It is known that many subunits of the Air Defense Forces are located at a considerable distance from each other. All of them -- on the scale of their unit -- compete between themselves. How things are going with their rivals, what experiences are their neighbors using, by means of what are they marching forward -- officers usually find out about this only during the summation of the results of the competition on a unit scale. If often happens also that in one subunit they successfully use an instructional methods find or a new method in training, but it is not known to their rivals, and if it is known, then only by hearsay.

However, any competition is strengthened especially by ensuring wide-spread publicity and comparison of results and by the opportunity to repeat progressive experience. But how can one realize these Leninist principles in the best way directly during the course of competition between subunits: artillery battalions, battalions, companies? Commanders, political workers and party activists are continuously reflecting on this.

Instructive experience in summing up the results of competition and in publicizing the achievements of progressive people has been accumulated in the unit which Lieutenant Colonel Alimov commands. A group of staff and political section officers works in the subunits before the next summation of results for the month's competition. Combat readiness, the progress in carrying out socialist obligations, and the state of discipline are checked. Then, all the best that has been achieved recently, is summed up, shortcomings are analyzed, indicators are compared, and the progressive subunit is determined based on the general results. Based on this, the unit commander sums up the results.

The commanders of the other subunits, the deputies for political affairs, the party and Komsomol activists, and the best specialists -- the winners in competition -- assemble here on the appointed day. The guests are

acquainted with the organization of combat training and competition. An exchange of experience takes place; contests on performing norms and demonstrations at launch positions, in classrooms and at command posts are conducted. Each one can visually compare his and his neighbor's results and convince himself where his rival is strong and what experience he must arm himself with. Yes, the summation of results, itself, becomes more concrete, and objective, revealing more thoroughly the successes and shortcomings in the competition.

The results of the past training year and of several months of winter combat training permit the conclusion to be made. Those military collectives, in which commanders, political workers and party organizations skilfully and widely use competition to raise the fighting men's awareness and their moral perfection, primarily achieve success.

"The development of the consciousness of the masses is .. the basis and main content of our work" -- this instruction of V. I. Lenin is the instructional methods foundation which has been tested by life and an accurate compass which permits organizing one's work faithfully and purposefully, including the organization of socialist competition. The main thing here consists of creating an atmosphere of high patriotic enthusiasm in the subunit and in the unit, and to arouse fighting men for the conscientious and selfless performance of service duties and socialist obligations. The ability to create these conditions is a true art which requires from commanders and political workers vast knowledge, solid instructional methods skills, and a search for effective instructional and indoctrinational forms and methods.

I would like to cite as examples the subunits which Engr-Maj Yu. Kobayakov, Maj I. Ocheretyanyy, Capt Ye. Kudiy and Sr Lt V. Danil'chenko command. The combat skill of the fighting men in these subunits is known far beyond the limits of the unit. The fact that public life is in full swing in these subunits is also noteworthy. Here, one can visit an interesting debate and discussion of a new book, listen to a highly qualified lecture on the international situation, and attend a concert organized in honor of the competition winners. In many cases, the initiative comes from the soldiers and sergeants themselves. Not one of them stands aside from the cause for which the collective lives or from the concerns which stir their colleagues. In the subunits, there are no laggards and no discipline violations.

Very often life itself and the situation which has taken shape during classes dictate to commanders and political workers the need to avoid the usual and display creativity and initiative. It is important that the leader not overlook this opportunity, but use it with the greatest effectiveness.

During the training of the missiles, which battery commander Capt S. Kharitonov was conducting, one of the crews twice did not confine themselves to the allotted time. The soldier through whose fault this had happened reacted rather peculiarly to the officer's comments.

"I am working in an allied specialty. Can I really be equal to the others?"

As it turned out, several other fighting men also considered that an allied specialty was a secondary matter. I have mastered, they say, the rudiments -- and that is sufficient. Yes and, they say, it is impossible to master several specialties equally well.

In changing his subordinates' mind, Captain Kharitonov cited examples where the interchangeability of missilemen had decided the outcome of a training battle. Then, he put a crew out of action with an input. The battery basically managed its assigned task, but the soldiers who took the places of their "out-of-action" colleagues, made many mistakes and errors. Then the officer put Jr Sgt N. Zanin in place of one of the crew members and gave the command to work on a norm. The result was excellent. He worked just as well as the second and third crew members.

The battery commander concluded: "Here is the skill that each should strive for."

The example of Junior Sergeant Zanin inspired his colleagues. Many wanted to try their strength there and then. Let their result be low, the desire to master allied specialties to perfection had appeared in the fighting men. Now during training sessions, they watch the actions of their comrades attentively and adopt their methods. The battery commander began to change the fighting men in the work positions more frequently, he considered the results of mastering allied specialties when summing up results. A competition for the title of best in an allied specialty was soon conducted in the subunit. Later, these competitions began to be conducted regularly. The battery became completely interchangeable.

The departure from a set pattern and the animation in competition evoked the fighting men's interest and aroused the desire to distinguish themselves and demonstrate results higher than their rival. Experienced competition organizers always consider this feature. Knowing that the performance of the same operations over a protracted length of time dulls interest and lowers activity, they try to place subordinates in unusual conditions and create a situation which requires actions full of initiative. The better one manages to do this, the more sharply a sense of rivalry appears and the higher the results.

Let us say that the loading of a launch mount is being practiced. The launch personnel are competing for the title of best crew. Replacing each other, the crews in turn perform the norm. However, here the leader announces that the result will be determined by the total of three loadings conducted one after the other. The tension immediately grows and the struggle intensifies.

Here is another example. It has become a tradition that experienced fighting men and excellent soldiers in combat and political training are obliged

to help new men and their less trained colleagues to master a specialty. As practice shows, the results of this competition are higher where commanders, when summing up results, consider how effective this help is and how it is specifically expressed, and encourage those who have achieved successes. Results are even higher when the incentives for encouraging those who have distinguished themselves during definite training stages are known in advance. In one of the subunits, the better trained fighting men, those who helped colleagues to become rated specialists, receive after appropriate tests the right to conduct classes with the young soldiers during the hours of independent training. This arouses the experienced fighting men to study military affairs even more thoroughly and train in every possible way.

Everything that is valuable and instructive that is born during competition is our invaluable property. Its skilful use will help commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol organizations to direct more effectively the men's struggle for the complete and qualitative performance of the socialist obligations in honor of 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birthday and the 35th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War.

Radar Operator Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Capt K. Shchanovich, a radar subunit commander, Carpathian Military District: "In the Search Mode"]

[Text] The white heat of our subunit radar operators' competition is steadily growing. They are preparing to greet the Leninist jubilee and the 35th anniversary of the Great Victory in a fitting manner. Numbers which testify to the growth of the sky scouts training appear each week on the stands in the Leninist room. We are seeing to it that there are no laggards in the subunit.

The successes of Lts N. Poltorako, S. Mantsevich and V. Kostrinchuk particularly make one happy. Having arrived here in a mountainous area after completing military schools, they did not shirk difficulties. The lieutenants assumed socialist obligations -- to master their duties in the shortest time and to carry out all combat training tasks with high ratings.

But there were difficulties in the formation of the young officers and they were not inconsiderable. For example, Lt S. Mantsevich lacked the skills to quickly and correctly evaluate the air situation and firmly control the crew. I remember how he directed a training session at the control post on his own for the first time. The young officer was not able to effectively control the actions of Pvt. A. Burlachenko, a radar operator. As a result, the information on one of the training targets was given late.

During the critique of the training session, it turned out that the lieutenant had evaluated the air situation basically using a map board and not using the display unit. The reason? He felt extremely unconfident behind the display screen.

It must be admitted that the thought flashed across my mind: Is it possible to entrust Mantsevich with a watch at the control post? All the threads of crew leadership meet here. However, having thought it over with Sr Lt A. Kramar, the political worker, we decided that such overcautiousness would lead to no good. By remaining, as they say, on the spare parts bench, the young officer would entirely lose faith in his strengths.

They acted otherwise: They helped the lieutenant to draw up a personal plan for independent work and to determine the main questions in it. Stress was placed on their practical working out. The chief of a progressive crew, Sr Lt A. Zhivoyedov, undertook to help Mantsevich in training. This was his socialist obligation during the competition.

In a month, the check-out class showed that Mantsevich oriented himself in an air situation and controlled the crews actions much more confidently. All the lieutenants have taken a considerable step forward in training and competition, relying on the help of our best specialists.

We are devoting very serious attention to high quality in the radar operators' professional training. This to cover the fact that it used to happen that some radar operators issued information mechanically, relying on the control post specialists. They, they say, examine everything and determine where the important target is and where the secondary one. This approach to combat work is, of course, not suitable everywhere. Our weapon is a crew served one. Each radar operator must feel responsible for timely and extremely reliable information on the air situation.

An exacting discussion took place on this during one of our work meetings. The officers and warrant officers [praporshchiki] began to struggle even more actively against weaknesses in classes and training sessions. We stressed the practice of the more complicated types of combat training, seeing to it that each specialist works, figuratively speaking, in the search mode for reserves.

There are such reserves. Take, for example, the training sessions on processing. In a number of cases, they have been impoverished by a tactical design. The "enemy" appeared weak and passive. It is no wonder that the operators and other specialists received high grades during these training sessions. However, it was worth expanding the tactical limits of the processing and give "enemy" actions novelty, surprise and a broader range of altitudes and speed since even our best operators, Jr Sgt A. Suslin and Pfc N. Proskuryakov, have begun to work not as confidently as before. Several training sessions which approximate a real situation as closely as possible were needed so that the specialists would learn to act not only intelligently but also more energetically, aware of the racing seconds and the breath of

combat. The sense of rivalry during their training sessions has grown considerably.

Or let us take the briefings which are conducted on the eve of the radar operators standing watch. An analysis showed that they often had a formal nature. Essentially the same questions were posed to the radar operators. How the specialists had acted before was not analyzed in detail. This led to the repetition of the same mistakes.

The situation changed when we began to attach a task - short exercise form to the briefings and to analyze the reasons for the mistakes in combat work in detail. The radar operators now solve assigned tasks more intelligently and have a clearer picture of their actions under different changes in the air situation.

Objective control materials are being used more effectively than before. Formerly, they were used primarily for the critique of conflict situations and for the report. Another helpful use has now been found for these materials. Instructive moments in the air situation are again played on the screens and boards and are studied by all the specialists.

The spirit of searching arouses us to be more concerned about the effectiveness of socialist competition. For example, we have paid attention to this fact. In individual crews the palm of victory has been given to those operators who have the greater amount of time tracking targets. Other indicators, as for example, the quality of performing norms, the growth of the fighting men's skill, their social and political activity are taken into consideration poorly.

It was necessary to remind the officers that such an approach to organizing competition by no means looks objective -- and not only remind them. Instructional classes, during which the methods for organizing competition on tasks and norms and for summing up its results were discussed in detail, were conducted with the crew chiefs.

Of course, everything has not been done by us, and the search continues. All efforts are now being directed toward completing the winter training period successfully and carrying out the competition obligations completely.

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CSO: 1801

UNITY AMONG WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES STRESSED

Sofia ARMEYSKI KOMUNIST in Bulgarian No 4, 1980 pp 24-30

[Article by Maj Gen Leonid Podkopayev, assistant representative of the commander-in-chief of the Joint Armed Forces in Bulgaria: "The Bases of Unity for the Military Alliance of the Fraternal Armies"]

[Text] The coming 25th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact Organization is being celebrated under the conditions of a constant rise in the economic potential of the socialist countries which are members of it, and in a situation of the successful fulfillment of the task posed by the decisions of the congresses of the communist and workers parties and planned in the programs of the approved five-year development plans.

The successes in the development of the countries in the socialist commonwealth and the further strengthening of the alliance, friendship and all-round cooperation of the states participating in the Warsaw Pact are having an ever deeper effect on world development. The socialist commonwealth is a powerful accelerator of progress in each of the fraternal countries and a general guarantee for steady advancement.

The fraternal unity of the socialist countries and the invincible might of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces under present-day conditions are the most reliable obstacle against the forces who are endeavoring to attack and to weaken the socialist states and to undermine and destroy their victories.

The military fraternity between the Armed Forces of the USSR, the Bulgarian People's Army and the armies of the other socialist states has profound historical roots. One of the glorious pages in the history of international proletarian solidarity is the participation of revolutionaries from different countries in the armed defense of the victories of Great October in Russia. In 1918-1920, thousands of representatives from other peoples fought heroically in the ranks of the Red Army against the domestic and foreign enemies of Soviet power.

The men from the armies of the socialist states are proud of the revolutionary past of their peoples, and they are carefully protecting and adding to their revolutionary and military traditions. They well remember that

the beginning of their military friendship on a basis of proletarian solidarity was started by the Great October Socialist Revolution which strongly linked the workers of Russia with their class brothers throughout the world. The names of the Bulgarian Sotir Cherkezov, the Hungarian Bela Kun, the Czech Jaroslav Hasek, the Pole Pietur Borewicz, the Serb Aleko Dundic and many other glorious sons of the fraternal peoples will always remain in the history of the heroic struggle of the Soviet people.

V. I. Lenin saw this participation by representatives from different nations in the defense of the victories of the October Revolution as a model of the international militant solidarity of the peoples. In his speech at a meeting of the Warsaw Revolutionary Regiment before its departure for the front on 2 August 1918, he stated: "On you has fallen the great honor of defending the sacred ideas with weapons in hand..., and realizing the international fraternity of peoples in fact."¹

In fighting against fascism, and for the freedom of the Spanish people, Soviet, Bulgarian and other internationalist fighters on the eve of World War II developed and enriched the glorious traditions of a joint armed struggle of their peoples against the imperialist tyrants.

During the period of the Great Patriotic War of the USSR against Nazi Germany in 1941-1945, the military fraternity of the Soviet Army with the armies of the Eastern European countries reached the greatest scope, and became one of the beneficial forms of cooperation among the peoples in their joint struggle to defeat the fascist aggressors, and for their liberty and independence.

The CPSU and the Soviet government were the initiators and main organizers of the military alliance of the USSR with the armies of the Eastern and Southeastern European countries. The communists from these countries were the most consistent and decisive fighters for the development and strengthening of the military fraternity of the armies.

The military alliance of the USSR with the Bulgarian People's Army and other armies during the years of the Great Patriotic War played an important military and political role, and its experience was of permanent significance for the further strengthening of military cooperation among the socialist states under present-day conditions.

After World War II, the balance of forces on the world scene altered, and imperialism once and for all lost its previous dominance over the world. No longer could it with impunity, as was the case previously, suppress the popular revolutions and forceably impose its "way of life" where the peoples rejected this. After understanding their historical doom, the ruling circles of the imperialist states followed a path of subversive activity against the USSR and the other socialist countries immediately after the conclusion of World War II. They began intensely to set up aggressive military blocs. In 1949, the main imperialist nations headed by the United States formed the North Atlantic Organization or NATO.

From the first days of its existence, this bloc served aggressive aims. It was directed primarily against the USSR and the other socialist states as well as against the peoples fighting for social and national liberation.

The inspired leader of the revolution, V. I. Lenin, pointed out that the peoples following the socialist development path "...without fail need a close military and economic alliance, otherwise the capitalists...will crush us and stifle us piecemeal."²

Consequently, the setting up of a joint military organization of the socialist nations in the form of the Warsaw Pact on 14 May 1955 was caused not by the internal needs of socialist development, but rather by the necessity that these countries be protected against the aggressive policy of the imperialist powers aimed at unleashing a new world war and at destroying the socialist victories of the peoples.

The Warsaw Pact of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid signed 10 years after the conclusion of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union marked the beginning of a qualitatively new stage in the development of all-round cooperation among the fraternal socialist countries and a strengthening of their military might.

In describing the relations which have been created between the socialist states that voluntarily joined the Warsaw Pact, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev pointed out: "At present we all have one common priceless achievement. After World War II not just a whole group of socialist states arose. What was created was what we term the socialist commonwealth.... It is a question not of an ordinary alliance of states, but rather a socialist alliance which is founded upon a common ideology and goals, on international solidarity of the workers, and an alliance in which the driving force for the first time is the working class and its tried vanguard, the communist and workers parties."³

In terms of its content, goals and tasks, the Warsaw Pact does not contradict the UN Charter. It differs fundamentally from all previous coalitions and from all the military-political blocs and alliances of the capitalist states.

While the military blocs of the imperialists serve aggressive aims and are directed against the socialist countries and against the peoples who have won their freedom, the military alliance of the socialist states is a truly defensive organization. It has no other aim than to defend the peoples of the socialist countries, the revolutionary victories and the cause of peace.

The members of the Warsaw Pact do not threaten anyone, they do not claim foreign territories, and do not intervene into the internal affairs of other states. The communist and workers parties in the socialist countries have defended and do defend the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems.

The signing of the Warsaw Pact did not contradict the peace-loving foreign policy of the CPSU and the other fraternal parties. The main goal of the commonwealth of socialist countries is to ensure their full security with the presence of two opposing sociopolitical systems, to provide reliable protection for the most progressive social system against the encroachments of the aggressor, and to create the necessary conditions for the successful construction of socialism and communism. "We have created this commonwealth," emphasized Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "primarily to counter the threat of imperialism and the aggressive military blocs created by it, in order to protect the cause of socialism and peace by common efforts."

In struggling to lessen tension in Europe and to check the arms race, the Warsaw Pact countries have repeatedly proposed that their organization be disbanded under the condition that simultaneously NATO be eliminated. But the leaders of the aggressive bloc have not agreed to this. International imperialism is not only not inclined to abandon the policy of military blocs but is doing everything possible to strengthen them.

Under present-day conditions, the necessity for an all-round strengthening of the Warsaw Pact Organization is brought about by the difficult international situation and by its intentional exacerbation by American imperialism and Chinese hegemonism. The successes of the fraternal countries in building socialism and communism, the upsurge in the national liberation movement, and the strengthening of the forces fighting for detente and peace have caused rabid animosity and fear among the opponents of Marxism-Leninism. In attempting in every possible way to stop these positive phenomena, imperialism is resurrecting the Cold War, it is constantly strengthening the arms race and in every possible way is creating the pretexts for expansion in all regions of the world where a danger to its position has arisen. In the aim of creating obstacles against a further activation of the world revolutionary process, the current U.S. leadership has chosen a line of an abrupt about-face in international development, from detente and the lessening of the danger of a thermonuclear world war to constant arming and the creation of confrontation and the threat of war.

At present, when the forces of imperialism have gone over to a counter-offensive against detente, peace and the rights of peoples, the unity of action of the socialist countries in defense of these greatest values is important as never before. The adventurist "doctrine" of imperialism threatens the peace and security of all states and peoples. It is the duty of everyone for whom peace is necessary and dear to rebuff these malicious plans.

The strength and solidarity of the fraternal countries are particularly apparent in the friendship and cooperation of their armies. The armies of the Warsaw Pact member nations must solve not only national but also international tasks in line with the collective defense of the security of the socialist commonwealth. Their military fraternity is fully manifested in international proletarian solidarity. This is brought about by the desire to pool the military forces of the fraternal worker-peasant states to rebuff the aggression of the imperialist blocs.

The traditions of the military alliance of fraternal armies set up in the years of the Great Patriotic War against Nazi Germany and further developed in the Warsaw Pact Organization are an inexhaustible source for indoctrinating the men of the armies in the socialist countries in a spirit of unshakable friendship and loyalty to the ideals of socialist internationalism and communism.

Among the armies of the Warsaw Pact member states there exist true fraternal relations based upon the principles of proletarian internationalism. Regardless of the fact that the socialist armies have certain differences in the staff and organizational structure, the weaponry and materiel, and possess their own particular features and traditions, they remain faithful brothers in spirit and weapons, they share a profound mutual respect and confidently rely on each other. Loyalty to their own peoples and loyalty to the cause of socialism and the ideas of Marxism-Leninism are a characteristic trait of the unity and military alliance of the armies in the Warsaw Pact states.

The unity and the military alliance of the fraternal armies are founded on a strong economic, sociopolitical, ideological and military-strategic basis.

The economic basis for the unity of the nations in the socialist commonwealth and their armies is the socialist method of production and the uniform productive forces and production relations. This makes it possible to carry out all-round economic and scientific-technical cooperation between the allied socialist states.

Economic cooperation between the socialist countries, in contrast to the capitalist economic alliances, exclusively serves the interests of peace and social progress.

The sociopolitical basis of the alliance of the fraternal countries and armies is the commonness of the social and state system of the Warsaw Pact countries. From this derive the common class interests in the building of socialism and communism, in defense of socialist victories, as well as the common goals in the struggle for peace and social progress. A socialist society is a truly democratic society in which the alliance between the working class, the peasantry and the other strata of the workers is the main force in the struggle against imperialism.

The ideological basis of the unity between the socialist countries and the fraternal armies is Marxist-Leninist teachings, and loyalty to the ideals of socialism and communism, to the principles of proletarian internationalism and class solidarity.

The ideological unity of the Warsaw Pact member nations is incompatible with manifestations of nationalism and opportunism and with the refusal to carry out a common duty.

The socialist countries have organized their relations on the principles of complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, state independence and sovereignty. Their fraternal mutual aid is an inseparable part of their relationships.

The military strategic basis for the military alliance between the fraternal socialist countries and their armies is the commonness of the goals of collective defense of the socialist victories. This is based upon Lenin's teachings about war and the army, on the uniform principles of organizing the armed forces, and on the common views and methods for training these forces in accord with the achievements of modern military science. The CPSU and the other Marxist-Leninist parties in the socialist countries in their military policy proceed from the main demand of maintaining the armed forces in constant combat readiness in order not to allow the aggressor to get the jump on us.

The strategic concepts of the Pentagon and NATO, in being the reverse of our principles, are aimed at aggression and world war. In altering and adapting them to one or another balance of forces on the world scene, their aggressive imperialist essence remains unchanged.

"Under present-day conditions, when the aggressive NATO bloc is increasing its military might," emphasized Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Defense, "a further strengthening of the unshakable friendship and solidarity in the socialist commonwealth, the maintaining of its defense potential and the necessary level of combat readiness in the socialist armies are an objective necessity and a clear manifestation of the unity of the international tasks and actions of the socialist countries."⁵

At the present stage, the Soviet Armed Forces and the Bulgarian People's Army fully meet the strictest demands for weapons, organizational structure, training and morale of the personnel. Intensive training activities are carried out in the units and on the ships. The combat readiness of the troops, and the field, air and sea training of the personnel are being improved.

"The men of the allied armies," emphasized Mar SU V. G. Kulikov, commander-in-chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member States, "united in a single international family, are always on guard. And as long as the danger exists of military attack by the enemies of peace and socialism, they will improve their military skill and their readiness to repel any aggression, no matter where it arises."⁶

In showing concern for their defense might, the socialist nations rely on the collective military might of the military alliance of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member States. This collective might, Comrade T. Zhivkov noted, is the best defense and support for each individual socialist country.... In an age of nuclear weapons it is essential to have a complete combination of one's own efforts in the area of national defense

with the collective might of the entire socialist commonwealth, and above all the USSR, the armed forces of which are presently the most dependable shield for the socialist nations.

The development and strengthening of the military fraternity of the armies in the Warsaw Pact states is inconceivable without constant and diverse work by the communist and workers parties in the area of the internationalist indoctrination of the men. The Marxist-Leninist parties view these activities as one of their primary tasks, and without successfully carrying it out it is impossible to speak seriously of an effective military alliance of the fraternal parties, for if the officers and men are not fully and firmly convinced of the vital need of the fraternal alliance in arms with the armies of the other socialist countries, such a military alliance cannot be strong and secure in peacetime, let alone in wartime.

The struggle of the communist and workers parties in the Warsaw Pact member states to strengthen and deepen the military friendship of the allied armies is inseparable from the indoctrination of the men in a spirit of high military and political vigilance and strong class hate for the enemies of socialism and for the imperialist aggressors.

In our days the world socialist system has become the leading force in the social development of the world. Imperialism is powerless to regain its lost historical initiative and to turn this development back.

On the basis of the decisions of the congresses of the communist and workers parties in the fraternal countries and from the materials of the international conferences, one can see the fundamental unity of the main areas for the social development of all the states in the socialist commonwealth and their all-round reciprocal cooperation.

As a consequence of this, the internationalization of the policy of the communist and workers parties has been strengthened, and there has been a greater role and importance for the coordinated decisions aimed at ensuring the common interests of the socialist commonwealth in the political course of each state.

The most important condition for the might and invincibility of the nations in the socialist commonwealth and for raising the effectiveness of their military cooperation is the unity and solidarity of the Marxist-Leninist parties. Under their leadership the security of the socialist states is guaranteed and the positions of real socialism are strengthened in the world.

Since time immemorial the cherished dream of mankind has been...peace. The best minds have struggled and hoped that the time would come when destructive wars would be ended once and for all. The Warsaw Pact Organization is a strong fortress and reliable shield for socialism and communism. As long as the aggressive NATO bloc exists, it will play an important role in providing the security of the socialist countries against military attack by the imperialist states, and in preserving peace.

The military alliance of the fraternal socialist states has honorably withstood the test of time. The military might of the Warsaw Pact is a permanently indestructible barrier against which the intrigues of international imperialism have foundered and will founder in the future.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Such." (Works), Vol 28, p 26.
2. Ibid., Vol 30, p 294.
3. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskiy Kurs" (By the Leninist Course), Vol 5, p 112.
4. Ibid., Vol 4, p 68.
5. D. Ustinov, "Na Strazhe Zavoyevaniy Oktyabrya" (On Guard for the Victories of October), Moscow, 1978, p 76.
6. V. Kulikov, VOYENNAYA MYSL', No 5, 1979, p 10.

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CSO: 2200

CIVIL DEFENSE TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

In Donbass Mines

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 9 Dec 79 p 2

[Article by I. Kotov: "Miners Take an Exam"]

[Text] The night-shift miners were working at the face when the warning signal sounded. Quickly and without any commotion or disorder, the men and commanders of the nonmilitary formations assembled at their designated points. I. Nikitin, the mine's CD chief, professed himself satisfied after observing his people form up: everybody was in place within the scheduled time. But the most difficult part lay ahead. According to the practice scenario, the mine imeni the SOTSIALISTICHESKIY DONBASS newspaper found itself in a "center of nuclear destruction." First to be tested were the reconnaissance specialists led by the surveyor N. Lozov.

The reconnaissance group demonstrated a good state of emergency training. It quickly established the limits of the "center of destruction," the condition of the "damaged" buildings and structures and the presence within them of "victims" requiring priority assistance. It also identified the points at which production lines and the municipal power system had been "damaged" and approximately how much emergency restoration work had to be done.

Reconnaissance data were quickly correlated and analyzed at CD headquarters. The necessary decisions were made to carry out rescue and urgent emergency restoration operations on the basis of comprehensive analysis and evaluation of the situation. A combined rescue team led by Ye. Sokolov performed skillfully in a "center of mass destruction." During the course of the rescue operations the leader concentrated his attention on the search for people in obstructed areas and collapsed buildings and protective structures. It was also necessary to render medical first aid to the victims and evacuate them from the "center of destruction." All team members accomplished their task with care, dispatch and initiative. This is extremely important in an emergency situation when every minute counts. DOSAAF members S. Kuznetsov and P. Kondratenko demonstrated especially high levels of training.

A great deal of work fell to the lot of emergency technical team members. Under the leadership of A. Staroverov they were able to deal with all "emergencies" within brief periods of time. They had to repair several water leaks, for example, and replace individual sections of pipe and damaged fittings.

The training of the civilian formation commanders and their skill in leading and directing their subordinates are worthy of praise. V. Gorbach, for example, skillfully organized the work of a radiation and chemical monitoring point, while N. Pavlichenko and N. Bolotskaya directed their formations skillfully and efficiently.

Political party work was effectively conducted among personnel in the course of the training exercise. The mine's party committee involved in this effort the communists, DOSAAF committee members and Komsomol activists. Everybody participating in the exercise was up-to-date on political events at home and abroad; they knew about those who had turned in outstanding performances as well as deficiencies in the performance of individual participants. Some people, for example, were wearing poorly adjusted gas masks, which would be fraught with serious consequences in a real emergency situation. Incidents like this were discussed during the critique. Generally speaking, exercise participants fully accomplished all their tasks and successfully passed their difficult examination.

In Donetsk

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 13 Feb 80 p 2

[Article by G. Teplyakov (Ponetsk): "They Acted Skillfully"]

[Text] "Fires," "destruction," interruptions in electric power transmission and disruptions in the water supply resulted from the "nuclear strike" delivered by the enemy in the area of the Lidiyevka mine.

Reconnaissance groups obtained more accurate information on the situation. The CD staff drew the necessary conclusions on the basis of this data. A. Angelovskiy, chief of the emergency technical service, gave oral instructions to begin urgent emergency restoration and rebuilding operations throughout the municipal electric power system.

Civilian formations had to negotiate an area of "radioactive contamination" over their route leading in to the "center of destruction." Firefighters skillfully put out the fires. Bulldozer operators V. Tomchuk and P. Guridov, both DOSAAF members, quickly opened up passages through obstructed areas and created routes of access to shelters. Personnel of a combined group led by N. Mironenkov rushed to these points and began work to rescue the "injured." Medical aid team members led by N. Chebotyuk gave them first aid.

"Disruptions" along the water, sewer and electric power transmission lines were dealt with quickly and efficiently. Personnel of the emergency technical team did a great deal of work. V. Dudka, the team leader and a DOSAAF member, assigned his men their tasks clearly and concisely.

This integrated facility-wide exercise showed that those participating in it are capable of performing skillfully in a complex emergency situation.

In Shakhtinsk, Kazakh SSR

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 5 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by I. Mingalev, chief of Civil Defense Shakhtinsk City Headquarters: "In Close Contact"]

[Text] The past training year was a productive one for the civil defense system in our city's enterprises, institutions and educational facilities. The level of civilian formation training was raised substantially. Instruction for workers and employees and for the population at places of residence was conducted in more organized manner. Attention in this connection was devoted primarily to the mastering of practical skills in providing protection against weapons of mass destruction.

This is the result above all of the great amount of attention devoted by party organization to the conducting of civil defense activities and of the participation in them of our DOSAAF organizations. It was thanks to the joint efforts of Society committees and the civil defense staffs that these tasks were fully accomplished in the facilities where V. Kolmykov, Yu. Solov'yev and Sh. Shamsutdinov are the CD chiefs.

The city's civil defense staff receives a great deal of assistance from the DOSAAF city committee, which is headed by S. Popuk. It isn't simply the fact that city committee activists participate directly in the activities conducted by the city CD staff. They also teach the aktiv of primary Society organizations how to render more effective assistance to the civil defense effort in our enterprises and institutions.

Working in close contact with the CD staff, for example, are the DOSAAF committees of the Molodezhnaya mine, the Gapayevskaya and the 2d and 13th secondary schools. Thanks to their harmonious efforts, these collectives achieve good results and earn prize-winning ratings in civil defense competition.

We recently conducted an integrated facility-wide demonstration exercise at the Molodezhnaya mine. This facility was not selected at random. A good material training base has been developed here, and first-rate instructional facilities are available. And the mine's primary DOSAAF organization is the best in the oblast in all areas. It has won the Society oblast committee's Red Challenge Banner in socialist competition three years in a row. I. Ovdin, chairman of the DOSAAF committee, has drawn together about him a tightly knit group of civil defense activists, DOSAAF members and

war veterans. Through their joint efforts they have equipped a basic military training center, a full-scale outdoor training site and a classroom for CD instruction.

When we speak of the activities conducted jointly by our CD staffs and DOSAAF committees, we also have in mind the mutual assistance given in connection with work in the area of military and patriotic indoctrination. Civil defense activists participate in this effort together with DOSAAF members.

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July 31, 1980

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